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§3.1. Modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Although the 
Rule Against Perpetuities may still have economic and socially desir-
able functions to perform under present-day conditions, it is generally 
agreed that the Rule has been overburdened with technicalities. Such 
aspects of the Rule as the doctrine of prospective hypothetical validity 
and the exception of possibilities of reverter and powers of termina-
tion have been the subject of much criticism.! 
The profession has sought clarification and modification of the Rule 
to relieve it of some of its most objectionable qualities. These aims 
have been accomplished to some extent by legislation 2 this year, with 
the adding of a new chapter to the General Laws, Chapter 184A, titled 
"The Rule Against Perpetuities." 3 
The new law applies to both legal and equitable estates, and is to be 
construed so as not to invalidate or modify any limitation which would 
have been valid prior to the time the new statute takes effect. Cer-
tain of the sections are set out here in full, as a summary would be 
inadequate. 
Section I reads as follows: 
In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in real or 
personal property limited to take effect at or after the termination 
of one or more life estates in, or lives of, persons in being when 
the period of said rule commences to run, the validity of the in-
terest shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the 
termination of such one or more life estates or lives. In this sec-
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2 Acts of 1954. c. 641. 
3 For a more detailed treatment of the new legislation. see Leach. The Rule 
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(1954); Leach. Perpetuities Legislation. Massachusetts Style. 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 
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tion an interest which must terminate not later than the death of 
one or more persons is a "life estate" even though it may terminate 
at an earlier time. 
This section can best be explained by a simple illustration. Suppose 
a testator who is survived by a spinster sister, aged ninety, and some 
nephews and nieces (children of deceased brothers and sisters) creates 
a trust to pay the income to the sister for life, and after her death to 
his nephews and nieces for their lives, with remainders on the death of 
the survivor of the nephews and nieces to their issue then living. If 
all the nephews and nieces are lives in being, the remainder interests 
will be valid. Under the strict construction of the Rule against Per-
petuities, however, the ninety-year-old spinster sister must be deemed 
capable of marrying and having children after the testator's death. 
This would render the ultimate remainder interests too remote, as the 
nephews and nieces would not all be lives in being. This limitation 
is substantially the same as the one before the Court in Worcester 
County Trust Company v. Marble,4 where the Court concluded that 
the testator meant to benefit only those nephews and nieces living at 
the date of his death. The new statute would make the remainder 
interests valid, because on the death of the sister it would appear that 
no other nephews and nieces had in fact been born. Therefore, those 
in existence were lives in being. Many other illustrations along the 
same line could be given. The point is that at the end of the life 
estates, if it appears that the remainder interests do not actually violate 
the Rule, they are saved by the statute. The New Hampshire Supreme 
Court arbitrarily adopted this rule in a recent case, Merchants National 
Bank v. Curtis.1S 
The meaning of the last sentence of this section may not be clear at 
first glance. A typical illustration would be a trust to pay the income 
to the testator's wife as long as she remained his widow. 
Section 2 of the chapter reads as follows: 
If an interest in real or personal property would violate the rule 
against perpetuities as modified by section one because such in-
terest is contingent upon any person attaining or failing to attain 
an age in excess of twenty-one, the age contingency shall be re-
duced to twenty-one as to all persons subject to the same age con-
tingency. 
A simple illustration of this would be as follows: A testator provides 
that his estate shall be held in trust and the income accumulated and 
the trust funds ultimately divided among those of his grandchildren 
who should reach the age of thirty. Under the old rule this would be 
void if at the death of the survivor of his children there were any 
grandchildren under nine years of age. This section cures that by pro-
• 316 Mass. 294, 55 N.E.2d 446 (1944). 
• 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953). 
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viding that the limit of thirty shall be automatically reduced to twenty-
one. Again this result was accomplished by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court by an arbitrary ruling in the case of Edgerly v. Barker.6 
The effective date of the statute is January I, 1955. The law applies 
only to "inter vivos instruments taking effect after that date, to wills 
where the testator dies after January first, nineteen hundred and fifty-
five, and to appointments made after the effective date of this act, 
including appointments by inter vivos instruments or wills under 
powers created before said effective date." 7 
§3.2. Rights of entry for condition broken and rights of reverter 
after determinable fees. The new chapter also changes the law under 
which rights of reverter after a determinable fee and rights of entry 
for condition broken can travel down through the centuries, with the 
result that at no time can a good title to the real estate be given. This 
unfortunate situation arose from early decisions of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court to the effect that these rights were not subject to the Rule 
against Perpetuities.1 The new statute provides that unless such rights 
are specifically limited so as to take effect, if at all, within the limits 
of the Rule against Perpetuities, they shall be subject to an arbitrary 
limitation of thirty years; and if the contingency which is to divest 
the title does not happen within said thirty years, the title remains 
absolute and the future right or condition ceases to exist. 
The statute does not apply to a case where both the fee simple de-
terminable and the succeeding interest, or both the fee simple and the 
right of entry are for public, charitable, or religious purposes.2 Like-
wise it does not apply to a deed or gift of the Commonwealth or any 
political subdivision. 
§3.3. Charitable trust held valid, although operation not imme-
diately practicable - Cy pres. A charitable trust should not be de-
clared invalid simply because present conditions would make it im-
practicable to carry out the specific intent of the testator. In Ford v. 
Rockland Trust Company 1 the will gave the testator's home to his 
brother for life and on his death to the town of Rockland "to be used 
as a home for aged women." If the town did not accept it, the property 
was to go to the bank, to be held on the trusts of the residuary clause. 
The residue was bequeathed to the bank in trust to pay the income to 
the brother for life and on his death to use the income for the home 
for aged women. The brother died in 1942. The town then voted not 
to accept the trust. The bank later sold the property under license 
• 66 N.H. 434. 31 Atl. 900 (1891). 
• Acts of 1954. c. 641. §2. 
§3.2. 1 Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645. 91 
N.E.2d 992 (1950); First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland. 155 Mass. 
171.29 N.E. 524. 15 L.R.A. 231 (1892); Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448 (1881); French 
v. Old South Society in Boston. 106 Mass. 479 (1871). 
• G.L.. c. 184A. §3. inserted by Acts of 1954, c. 641. 
§3.3. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 27, 116 N.E.2d 669. 
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of court and added the proceeds to the trust fund. On the death of 
the brother the trust amounted to $14,230.77. On Decemb~r 31, 1951, 
with the proceeds of the sale, appreciation of assets, and accumulated 
income, it amounted to $30,550.14. Nothing had been done by the 
trustee toward establishing the home. The maintenance of a home 
was expensive; the town had closed its infirmary because of lack of 
patients and on account of old age assistance; and an existing home 
for aged women had been liquidated in 1942 because there was no 
longer a need for such a home, there having been no applicants for 
several years. 
The heirs of the testator filed a petition to have the fund turned 
over to them on the ground that the trust had failed. The probate 
judge dismissed the petition and decreed that the bank held the fund 
for the uses and purposes set forth in the will. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that while the establishment of a 
home for aged women is at present impracticable, the trust had not 
failed. The bequest was a valid public charity. The testator had a 
manifest intent to benefit the class of persons designated. His idea 
to have his home used was subordinate to his general intent. 
Although the question of cy pres was not raised, the benefits of the 
charity should be made available within a reasonable time for the class 
designated. If either the Attorney General or the bank should within 
sixty days amend its answer and ask that the fund be administered 
cy pres, the case is to be remanded to the Probate Court for consid-
eration. 
§3.4. Enforcement of charitable trust by another charity having 
a contingent interest in fund. In another interesting case before the 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1954, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Quincy} the issue was raised as to the right of a private interest, here 
a remainderman, to question whether or not a public charity was being 
properly administered. To summarize the facts in the case: In 1870 
a fund was bequeathed to the City of Quincy to establish a Female 
Institute. If Quincy did not accept it or failed to comply with the 
terms of the gift, the fund was to revert to Dartmouth College. In 
1951 the Trustees of Dartmouth College brought proceedings for a 
declaratory judgment to determine whether Quincy was performing its 
obligations. The city filed a demurrer on the ground that Dartmouth 
College had no standing to bring the petition. 
The Court held that while ordinarily it is the exclusive function of 
the Attorney General to enforce public charitable trusts, in this case 
Dartmouth had a special interest in the maintenance of the fund and 
could maintain its petition. 
§3.5. Meaning of the phrase "or their heirs by right of representa-
tion." The word "heirs" and the phrase "by right of representation" 
have given the courts many difficult problems of construction in the 
§3.4. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 243. 118 N.E.2d 89. 
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past. The two came together in Sweeney v. Kennard,! where the will 
created a trust for the benefit of the testator's son George. On George's 
death, if he died without issue (as he did), the trust was to continue 
for the benefit of his wife during her life. On her death the trust fund 
was to be divided equally between the testator's other two sons, Byron 
and John, "or their heirs by right of representation." George died in 
1916, and his widow Ethel in 1951. Between those dates John died, 
leaving a widow Evelyn, two daughters, and a son Henry, who died 
shortly after his father. Also Byron died between those dates, leaving 
a widow, who died in 1953, and two daughters, both living. The case 
arose on a petition for instructions by the trustees as to how the princi-
pal should be distributed on the death of George's widow. The par-
ticular question at issue was the meaning of the phrase "or their heirs 
by right of representation." 
The Court held that the estate should be divided one half to the 
statutory heirs of John and the other one half to the statutory heirs 
of Byron, determined as of the dates of their deaths. The Court said 
that the word "heirs" in this case did not mean issue, but meant heirs 
and was not limited to heirs by blood, and that the use of the phrase 
"by right of representation" was intended to take care of the possi-
bility that the heirs might be in different degrees of descent. In this 
case there was both real and personal property, and the Court said that 
where a will gives both realty and personalty to the heirs of a person, 
the gift is to those entitled to that person's real estate by descent, and 
that such heirs are determined, as a general rule, as of the time of that 
person's death. 
§3.6. Life tenancy and the right to "use" the property. Another 
example of unnecessary ambiguity in the use of terms was presented 
in Hinkley v. Clarkson.1 There the draftsmen created the problem by 
using the following language in a bequest: "All the rest and residue 
of my estate of whatever nature and wherever situated I give, devise 
and bequeath to my brother ... with the right to use the property 
during his lifetime, and on his death to be divided equally among my 
nieces and nephews." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The question was, of course, the extent of the interest of the brother. 
Had he a life estate with a right only to the income during his life, 
or had he a right also to invade the corpus for his "use" during life? 
The Court held, first, that the words created only a life estate, and 
second, that the "use" of the property given by the will was the right 
to the income only, and not the right to alienate or consume it. The 
Court distinguished the case from those where the gift-over is of what 
may remain at the death of the life tenant. 
In the last two cases discussed the problems were created for the 
courts when the lawyers involved did not use care in draftsmanship. 
§3.5. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 603, 120 N.E.2d 910. 
§3.6. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 120 N.E.2d 285. 
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It may seem strange that lawyers will take great pains to cover very 
remote possibilities of ambiguity in expressing the grant, as here-
"I give, devise and bequeath" - and then will leave very broad am-
biguities in the actual creation of the gift. Certainly these cases illus-
trate that it is as much the lawyer's professional duty to make an 
effort to avoid litigation as it is his duty to represent clients before 
the bar. This SURVEY is intended to aid as much in the former as in 
the latter. 
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